Beijing's Unlikely Ally in Burma?
Kelly Currie, Wall Street Journal / November 25, 2010

The Nov. 13 release of Aung San Suu Kyi has set off a predictable deluge of commentary about the significance of her return to the fore of Burma's pro-democracy movement. But there has been little commentary on how China factors into Ms. Suu Kyi's future. Beijing's reaction to this event, and how Ms. Suu Kyi fits into China's strategic calculus in Burma, may be one of the most important yet poorly understood aspects of this unfolding morality play.

The conventional wisdom is that the Chinese government's overriding concern with cross-border stability and access to Burma's abundant energy and other resources, not to mention a shared authoritarian character, dictate that it will continue to support the Burmese junta. Beijing supposedly prefers the junta's "discipline-flourishing" version of democracy to a genuine, and potentially chaotic, one under Ms. Suu Kyi's leadership. Moreover, Beijing is understood to consider Ms. Suu Kyi "pro-Western" and a leader who would likely swing Burma into the American orbit.

If this widely held view is not in fact wrong, it should at least be reconsidered and challenged—not least by Beijing—in light of the priorities articulated by both China and Ms. Suu Kyi herself.

Ms. Suu Kyi's actions and policy pronouncements since her release should make policy makers in Beijing sit up and take notice. In particular, her immediate focus on a more durable and equitable resolution of Burma's festering interethnic relations should pique interest from Kunming to Zhongnanhai. By proposing to reopen negotiations on a new Panglong Agreement, modeled on the 1947 pact between the central government and minorities, Ms. Suu Kyi is not only aspiring to complete the unfinished work of her martyred father but is also potentially laying the groundwork for genuine security and economic prosperity in the border areas where most ethnic nationalities live.

Such an outcome is in China's interests, since it would resolve the dilemma arising from its present conflicted role. Beijing poses as both the protector of ethnic Chinese minority peoples on the Burmese side of the border, and also the political protector and economic enabler of their tormentors.

The best possible resolution of this dilemma is a real peace between Burma's central authorities and the ethnic nationalities, particularly the armed groups that are concentrated on the China-Burma and Thai-Burma borders. The Chinese government's hopes that the recent elections would help move the country in that direction have proven to be illusory, as armed conflict has resumed in the wake of widespread disenfranchisement and continued state violence in ethnic areas.

The unstable situation with the ethnic nationalities also has major implications for China's quest to exploit Burma's natural resources, as both petroleum pipelines and major hydroelectric projects traverse or are located in ethnic homelands. These projects have already been the site of anti-Chinese violence.

According to recent reports by the International Crisis Group, policy makers in China are increasingly frustrated with the arbitrary and unpredictable junta, particularly its rough approach to the ethnic groups on China's border. If Ms. Suu Kyi can succeed where the junta's coercive approach has failed, China would be one of the biggest beneficiaries.

Likewise, there is something for China in Ms. Suu Kyi's visit to an HIV/AIDS clinic in Rangoon and her exhortation to do more for those suffering from Burma's epidemic. Burma has some of the most severe infection rates in the region, not only from HIV/AIDS itself but also from attendant infectious diseases such as hepatitis and tuberculosis.

The junta's response has been to ignore, stigmatize and harass not only infected persons but those trying to assist them, including at times throwing up barriers to the work of local and international organizations. In 2005, at the height of the epidemic, UNAIDS reported that the junta spent less than $150,000 on HIV/AIDS treatment. The same year, the U.N.'s Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis withdrew from the country due to problems working with the government. While the situation for donors and implementing agencies has improved in recent years as the regime has begun to grasp the seriousness of the problem, the needs swamp the available resources.

Unsurprisingly, given the Burmese junta's poor response to the epidemic and the nature of cross-border trade between China and Burma, public health experts and epidemiologists have tracked a vector of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases that begins in Burma and sweeps into China's Yunnan province—home of China's highest HIV/AIDS infection rates—before spreading out into the rest of the country. Absent a responsible government that genuinely cares about attacking the problem on the Burmese side, this will be an ongoing slow-motion disaster for not only the authorities in Yunnan and surrounding provinces that are most heavily impacted, but for China's central authorities as well.

While Ms. Suu Kyi's post-release moves are primarily intended for a domestic political audience, it seems clear that there is a not-too-subtle message there for the junta's patrons in Beijing: The Lady is someone they not only can deal with, but at the end of the day, she would be a better partner than the capricious xenophobes in Naypyidaw.

Ms. Currie is a senior fellow with the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.

Myanmar's Sham Election
Nick Clegg / October 4, 2010

We are now a month away from the first elections in Burma in 20 years. That should give us cause to celebrate. Sadly, that is wishful thinking. Burma’s 55 million people continue to suffer brutal oppression. Abject, needless poverty is, for most, a daily reality. These elections will be little more than a sham to perpetuate military rule.

So when Asian and European leaders meet on Monday in Brussels, the U.K. will be calling for us to speak with one voice against the gross mistreatment of the Burmese people.

That means being unequivocal: These elections will be neither free nor fair. Opponents of the ruling party lack resources and are systematically targeted by the current regime. Thousands of political prisoners remain incarcerated. Various ethnic parties have been refused the right to participate. Last month the military dissolved the National League for Democracy — its biggest perceived threat.

The situation is little better for those parties which are being allowed to participate. The regime they oppose has passed deeply unfair election laws and runs the election commission. In Burma all media is heavily censored by the state.

So the election result is a foregone conclusion. Under the constitution a quarter of seats are already reserved for the military. In half of the remaining seats parties loyal to the regime will run uncontested, their opponents unable to field a candidate. The regime is therefore guaranteed a substantial majority — before a single vote is even cast.

The consequence for Burma is the return to power of a ruling elite that has presided over widespread human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, rape and torture. That same regime has been guilty of profound economic mismanagement and corruption.

While they routinely blame sanctions for weak development, the truth is that they have squandered Burma’s natural resources and export opportunities. The country’s infant mortality rate is now amongst the highest in Asia.

These failings are undeniable. Yet some are tempted to overlook the deep flaws in the approaching election. Clearly, it would be more convenient for the international community to quietly agree that any election is better than no election. Burma would recede in the mind, allowing us to “move on.”

That is attractive for nations that insist we should not interfere in one anothers’ affairs. And the West could not be accused, as it sometimes is, of attempting to recreate the world in its own image.

These are not reasons to ignore the truth. The European Union has already made it clear that sanctions — targeted at the regime and its sources of revenue — will not be lifted until genuine progress is made on the ground. We must now work with our Asian partners, using our collective clout, to push for that progress. Members of the Asia-Europe Meeting group, or ASEM, account for nearly 60 percent of the global population — and the same proportion of global trade. Burma’s military regime should know that, until it satisfies international demands, it will meet the same disapproval whether it looks East or West.

Not only is that our shared moral duty, but it is in our strategic self-interest too. Without a process of national reconciliation in Burma, the risk of instability is real. Ethnic cease-fires look increasingly fragile. A return to conflict would have devastating humanitarian consequences, undermining regional security and leading to further refugee flows into neighboring countries and beyond.

So we must continue to exert pressure on the regime to engage all opposition and ethnic groups in a meaningful dialogue. The objective must be a fair settlement that gives ethnic groups a political voice and protects their minority rights. All prisoners of conscience — including the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi — must be released without delay. Reconciliation must be geared toward the social and economic development that has long evaded the Burmese state.

This week is an opportunity for Asian and European nations to reaffirm that message. Military men must know that swapping their uniforms for suits will not change the demands of the international community. We will not be pacified by a democratic facade. Our expectations will not drop.

Nick Clegg is deputy prime minister of Britain.

Burma’s Democratic Charade
Vaclav Havel, Project Syndicate / September 28, 2010

On November 7, when Burma’s first general election for almost two decades is to be held, a well-rehearsed script will play out. The country’s ruling generals will twist what is meant to be a democratic process, whereby the people get to express their will, into a mockery of free expression in which people vote in fear and without hope.

The international community must judge Burma’s generals by their actions, not their words and promises. The facts on the ground in Burma speak the truth more loudly than all the proclamations from the generals about a free ballot and a democratic transition.

More than 2,100 political prisoners remain in jail in Burma. Many have been tortured, kept in horrific conditions, and denied medical care. Attacks against the country’s ethnic minorities continue, with the deliberate targeting of civilians, including children, by the Burmese military and police. The country’s media remains censored, freedom of expression denied, and the most popular political party in the country, the National League for Democracy, which won elections in 1990, has been forced to disband because it decided not to register for the November elections.

In such conditions, free and fair elections will be impossible. This so-called democratic transition, a process designed solely by dictators and with input only from the regime’s loyalists, will result in continued dictatorship.

Before Burma’s fate is sealed in a new-model dictatorship, the United Nations must immediately and vigorously embark on a fresh process designed to deliver national reconciliation and democracy to that troubled country. The international community, East and West, must unite behind a UN-led initiative to start genuine dialogue.

But, for this dialogue to have any real legitimacy, it must include the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who has endured decades of house arrest, and her party, the NLD. Other democratic opposition groups, and genuine ethnic-minority representatives, also need to be given a voice in the process.

Pressure must be brought to bear to bring Burma’s generals to a negotiating table where real negotiations take place. All the tools at the disposal of the international community should be used to bring this about.

But responsibility for assisting Burma does not lie solely at the door of the UN. The pressure on Burma’s generals must also be bilateral and multilateral – and should be reinforced by carefully calibrated economic measures, including targeted financial and banking sanctions.

Action must also be taken to end the impunity with which the Burmese generals have ruled. The dictatorship stands accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, mostly against the country’s minorities, who chafe at decades of oppression, ostracism, and military misrule. The UN General Assembly should follow the UN Special Rapporteur‘s recommendation to establish a Commission of Inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma.

Moreover, the UN Security Council should impose an arms embargo against Burma, as it has in other countries similarly afflicted by conflict and serious human rights abuses. Those countries supplying arms to Burma expose themselves to charges of complicity in the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the dictatorship.

Dictatorship and human rights abuses will continue in Burma after November 7. We do not need to wait until after the election to know this. So there is no excuse for continued inaction. Now is the time for the world to unite behind the people of Burma, and to help bring them peace and dignity at last.

Václav Havel is a former President of the Czech Republic.

India's Flawed Myanmar Policy
Vishal Arora, World Politics Review / August 04, 2010

Last week's visit to India by Burma's military ruler, Gen. Than Shwe, during which several bilateral agreements and treaties were signed, highlighted the tensions in New Delhi's policy toward the isolated Southeast Asian country. The red carpet welcome that New Delhi accorded to Than sparked protests by Burmese refugees, who in addition to denouncing Than as a murderer and dictator, argued that a democratic Burma would better serve India's strategic interests.

India once openly supported the Burmese democracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi. But in the 1990s, it changed course and stepped up engagement with the military junta based on strategic interests. Almost two decades later, according to many analysts, New Delhi has not achieved any of its three main strategic goals in Burma.

Åshild Kolås, of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, identified India's primary interests with regard to Burma as increasing security in the border regions "through generous military assistance and agreements on counterinsurgency cooperation," promoting New Delhi's "Look East policy" by "building overland transportation routes from northeast India to Southeast Asia and the Bay of Bengal," and finally, "countering Chinese influence."

With regard to military cooperation, Kolås said, Burma, officially known as Myanmar, has failed to deliver help that New Delhi needs to confront insurgent groups in India's northeast that operate from across the Burmese border. "Even if the Burmese military were capable of delivering, sustaining cross-border militancy is a much better bargaining chip for the regime," she explained.

Kolås added that India's Look East policy was reckless, since "opening up to a country in crisis may offer few benefits while increasing challenges such as drug trafficking (opium, heroin and methamphetamines), weapons smuggling, human trafficking and the spread of HIV/AIDS."

She went on to say that India had "no chance of competing with China for any 'favors' from the Burmese regime," because Burma and China had stronger converging interests. China sees Myanmar as a transport route for oil and gas that bypasses the Strait of Malacca. Meanwhile, she explained, the Burmese regime wants to maintain China as a key ally due to its status as a permanent member with veto power in the U.N. Security Council.

Burma's preferences are apparent in its recent strategic choices. Benedict Rogers, in his book, " Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant," claimed that in 2007, Than granted Beijing special privileges for exploiting Burma's natural resources, agreeing to sell newfound gas from the Shwe gas fields to China, even though a competing Indian bid was more attractive financially.

Renaud Egreteau, an analyst from the University of Hong Kong, agreed with Kolås, arguing that India could not go beyond a tactical and targeted partnership because of "Burma's nationalistic agenda, which sees India as a credible counterweight to China, but not more."

Satyabrat Sinha, assistant professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Sikkim University in northeast India, said that Burma's advantageous bargaining position exacerbates New Delhi's predicament: The Burmese junta knows that India cannot afford to "lose" Burma to the Chinese, nor can India allow the security situation in its own northeast to deteriorate.

Egreteau further explained that, given Burma's "nationalist and xenophobic legacies and policies," the Burmese regime can keep Asia's globalizing and democratizing trends at bay to remain the master of its own foreign policy, including toward India. He added that a vocal policy of opposition to the Burmese junta had little chance of success, given Burma's geopolitical environment. That explains "the tactful Indian policy of discreetly courting and engaging a Burmese military that will remain Burma's key policymaking player in the next decade."

However, Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury, from the Calcutta Research Group, argues that India's "all-carrot policy" vis-à-vis the military junta in Myanmar has not paid off. "[India's] Sinophobia may be based on certain developments taking place in [its] immediate neighborhood, but [India's] policies to deal with the growing Chinese presence in the region smacks of immaturity." Chaudhury compared India's failure to formulate an independent Burmese policy to its decision-making on Iran policy, which he described as being "outsourced" to Washington. India voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005, allegedly coerced by the United States as part of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.

Kolås believes India could play a larger role in encouraging reforms in Myanmar by engaging in a critical dialogue with the regime as well as with the opposition, and by providing international humanitarian assistance to Myanmar through the U.N. She also suggested that India would be better-positioned to support international and regional efforts to encourage political reforms in Myanmar were it to join a global arms embargo against Myanmar and cease cooperation for counterinsurgency purposes.

Chaudhury said that human rights diplomacy may or may not be a major issue in the foreign policy-making of a country. But India's pride in being the world's largest democracy is incompatible with remaining "oblivious to the continuous rights violations in Myanmar, and indirectly or directly [legitimizing and strengthening] an authoritarian regime in its neighborhood in the name of . . . national interest and national security."

Despite these flaws, New Delhi's policy on Burma continues to be driven by the fear of having a hostile neighbor with Chinese influence in the east, in addition to its archrival Pakistan on the western border.

Vishal Arora is an independent journalist based in New Delhi, India. He writes and researches on politics, culture, religion and foreign relations in South Asia. His articles have appeared in the media in India, the U.S., the U.K. and the UAE. He can be contacted at vishalarora_in@hotmail.com.

Racing China for energy
Livemint / October 12, 2009

The gap between India and China in the race for energy security has widened in the past month, with India suffering setbacks in hydrocarbon projects in Iran.

Who wins the India-China race is a question that will be up in the air for some time; but in energy security, China has stolen a head start. The gap has widened in the past month, with India suffering setbacks in hydrocarbon projects in Iran, while China keeps vying for assets in West Africa this week.

India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC) and Hinduja group failed to win a bid for Iran’s South Azadegan oilfield against China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) last month. Then, in a matter of a week, Iran cut the same Indian joint venture’s stake in a Persian Gulf gas field by one-third. What is India doing wrong?

Let’s first face some facts. Petroleum makes up about one-third of India’s import bill: In 2007-08, it cost at least Rs3.4 trillion. However impending the threat of climate change, India isn’t about to wean itself off hydrocarbons anytime soon.

So the government needs to take this seriously, especially since it has been on a losing streak for a while. In August 2005, ONGC lost a bid for PetroKazakhstan to CNPC—the Chinese offered an extravagant 21.1% premium for a stake in the Central Asian oilfields that India couldn’t match.

In 2004, another Chinese firm beat ONGC for exploration work in Angola. And despite India’s friendly ties with Myanmar, China has taken the lead there too.

So what should be done? One, the ministry of external affairs should be involved in this quest, too. In Iran’s case, the recent souring of bilateral relations since the US-India nuclear deal could have hurt. Depending on the country, diplomatic efforts require a push or a rethink.

Two, given that ONGC lost PetroKazakhstan on account of sheer financial power, companies may need more cash. This doesn’t mean more off-balance-sheet oil bonds; deregulating oil prices can itself help companies cope with such problems.

Three, there’s a need for a comprehensive national strategy, directed by the petroleum minister. India is still thinking in project-by-project terms, missing out on assets that don’t yield immediate value. Government coordination is also poor: Companies often have to wait for bureaucratic approval to make sizeable investments.

India can smirk all it wants at the wariness China’s acquisitiveness draws. A failed bid for a California oil firm in 2005 and Rio Tinto this year make India look better in contrast. But China’s misfortunes have yet to translate into India’s gains.

What’s more, these misfortunes shouldn’t be the excuse for the lack of requisite political will. Without that, India is sure to be left far behind.

Pipeline strengthens Sino-Burmese ties
Petroleum Economist / July 03, 2009

Unlike Western governments, which have tightened sanctions against Myanmar (Burma), China has provided growing political and economic support to the military government in Rangoon, a decision to push ahead with gas and oil pipelines connecting Myanmar to China indicates a continued tightening of economic ties between the two countries.

Construction of the Myanmar section of the pipelines will start in September, according to China's official news agency, Xinhua, with China's largest oil company, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), expected to carry out the work. The Chinese stretch of the pipelines will be built either by CNPC or its PetroChina subsidiary.

A 2,800 km, 1.2bn cubic feet a day (cf/d) pipeline will carry gas from Myanmar, or further afield, to Kunming, in Yunnan province, and on to Nanning, in Guanxi region. A 1,100 km, 400,000 barrels a day (b/d) crude pipeline will run from a port in Burma's Rakhine state to Guizhouo and Chongqing, through Kunmin, providing a new route for supplies from the Middle East and Africa.

The gas pipeline will tap supplies secured in December, when CNPC signed a 30-year agreement with a consortium led by South Korea's Daewoo International to take gas from the Shwe field in Myanmar's A-1 offshore block. The combined reserves of Shwe and the neighbouring  Shwe-Phyu and Mya fields – being explored by the same consortium – have been estimated by Daewoo at 4.5-7.7 trillion cf. India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), one of Daewoo's partners at Shwe, said in June that it expects flows to start in 2012. The country's total proved gas reserves stood at 17.5 trillion cf in 2008, according Cedigaz (see Figure 1).

At present, Myanmar's gas producers are heavily reliant on sales to neighbouring Thailand. Thailand's state-owned PTTEP is heavily involved in exploiting Myanmar's oil and gas resources and takes virtually all of the country's gas production.

However, China's long-term commitment to the gas industry offers Myanmar's regime a much bigger source of future revenue than Thailand – income that will be gratefully received by a government struggling to attract foreign investment in most areas of the economy because of Western sanctions. Both the EU and the US tightened sanctions after the 2007 crack-down on street protests. The country's precarious economic position has been exacerbated by the global economic downturn, which has caused a sharp fall in the price of the country's mining and energy exports.

According to government figures, new foreign direct investment (FDI) totalled $0.99bn in the first 11 months of the 2008-09 financial year, representing a sharp rise from $273m in the full year 2007-08. But around $0.86bn of that came from Chinese investment in mining. Beyond the mining sector, more than two thirds of FDI has been made in hydrocarbons projects over the last three years.

The Chinese deal also has implications for Myanmar beyond the oil and gas sector. "China has always enjoyed preferential status from Myanmarese governments in return for its investments, economic aid and political support in the international community," says one Asia-based regional energy analyst. "The decision to sell gas to China could further strengthen that relationship."
China's pipeline investment is not entirely risk free, as it could suffer if public protests resurfaced and prompted a change of government, but this seems unlikely. "The military government is in near complete control of the system and it seems determined to provide security protection to new gas-export pipelines, as it already does for gas-export pipelines to Thailand," the analyst says.

Despite the sanctions, a number of international companies, principally from Asia, remain active in Myanmar's energy industry. Besides Chinese and Thai firms, France's Total and the US' Chevron both retained long-standing offshore interests – Chevron's were acquired when it took over Unocal in 2005. In addition to Daewoo (51%), the Shwe consortium includes ONGC (17%), Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (15%), Indian gas company Gail (8.5%) and Korea Gas (8.5%). Japan's Nippon Oil and Malaysia's Petronas are also active in the country.

Nonetheless, investments in Myanmar continue to attract strong protests from pressure groups inside and outside the country. Shwe has been subject to criticism over its environmental and social impact. In June, two non-governmental organisations said the South Korean government had rejected a complaint they filed with it last October. EarthRights International and the Shwe Gas Movement had alleged that forced relocations and other human-rights violations linked to the Shwe project had violated OECD guidelines. The NGOs have called on the OECD to launch an investigation.