Myanmar frozen in time by ethnic rift
Stanley A Weiss, Asia Times / November 4, 2010

The topic of assassination lends itself to one of the recurrent parlor games of world history. If John F Kennedy had never been assassinated, would the United States have gotten out of Vietnam? If Yitzhak Rabin hadn't met an assassin's bullet, would the Oslo Accords have led to peace between Israelis and Palestinians? If Archduke Franz Ferdinand had survived his attacker in Sarajevo, would the world have gone to war in 1914?

There is no place on earth where the consequences of a past assassination are more acutely felt than in Myanmar, also known as Burma. The brutal slaying of General Aung San by machine-gun fire in 1947 - six months after he helped negotiate Myanmar's independence from Britain, a short time before he was to take over as prime minister - left many dreams unrealized.

But it is one issue in particular, left unresolved to this day, that animates the conversation of national unity and progress: what to do about Myanmar's many ethnic minorities?

Just weeks before his death, Aung San convened a tribal summit which led to an agreement committing Myanmar to a spirit of equal representation - an agreement that was frozen in time when he was killed. Whatever the outcome of this coming Sunday's parliamentary elections in Myanmar - the first such vote in two decades - unless and until somebody picks up Aung San's mantle and works to resolve the ethnic question, Myanmar will remain frozen in time.

"There is no question," says a long-time Western observer who has done extensive work in country with Myanmar's ethnic groups. "It's all about the tribes. Ignore that fact, and you make the same mistakes we have made in Iraq and Afghanistan, where silenced minorities have wrecked havoc."

Slightly smaller than the state of Texas and situated at the crossroads of India and China, Myanmar is home to 135 distinct ethnic groups. The largest ethnic group by far is the Burman, which comprises about 60% of Myanmar's 50-million-plus population.

During Myanmar's period of colonial rule, from 1886 to 1948, Great Britain preferred hiring ethnic minorities to work in its colonial administration, for fear of putting the majority Burman in positions of power. As a result, ethnic nationals were often better educated and developed strong ethnic identities.

After independence was declared in 1948, the tables were turned and Burman politicians dominated the government, with long memories of their time in exile. "Many ethnic leaders viewed the Burman leaders as hegemons whom they could not trust," writes Myanmar observer Kyaw Yin Hlaing. "They agreed to join the union only out of respect for General Aung San."

Convening a meeting at the town of Panglong, Aung San promised an equal power-sharing agreement, pledging to ethnic minority leaders that they could opt out of the union 10 years after independence if the benefits of cooperation failed to materialize.

The "Panglong Agreement" gave rise to a spirit of equal representation that would be short lived. After Aung San was killed, Burman leaders tried but failed to work the agreement into the new constitution. Ethnic minority groups rebelled, with a handful launching civil wars against the Burman majority.

In 1961, 200 ethnic leaders met for a constitutional review and demanded a "genuine federal union". In response, in 1962, a convention was convened in Rangoon (now Yangon) to rewrite the constitution. It proposed to unite Myanmar as one state while assuring equal representation in its national assemblies.

It was too much for the military, which launched a coup during the convention. Different military juntas have ruled ever since. Certain armed ethnic insurgent groups have fought continuously against the junta in battles that have led to some of the worst human-rights abuses in recent history.

Since 1990, world attention has focused on Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi. Her National League for Democracy party won 58 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections in 1990, only to see the results annulled and Suu Kyi imprisoned or held under house arrest for 14 of the next 20 years.

So what can America do to help? First, if America's allies at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recognize this coming Sunday's election results, so should the US. Says Ma Thanegi, who spent three years in prison working as Suu Kyi's personal assistant: "If the West really wants to help the people, they should accept the new government and give it a chance."

Second, right-size US humanitarian aid. Today, the United States Agency for International Development spends US$10 million annually in Thailand supporting 150,000 Myanmese refugees, but only $2 million in Myanmar to support an estimated 500,000 internally displaced citizens who have been driven from their homes amid armed conflict. Those numbers should be reversed.

Third, use America's leverage with ASEAN to bring the Myanmese military, the pro-democracy movement and non-Burman Ethnic Nationalities Council together. With broad economic sanctions in place since 1997 and more targeted measures implemented against senior junta members and their close associates under the George W Bush administration, the US has little leverage with Myanmar. However, ASEAN now aims to sign a free-trade agreement with the US and the grouping's inclusion of Myanmar stands in the way of a deal. Condition the end of economic sanctions on movement toward a three-part federation.

In preparation for the election, Myanmar's military leaders unveiled a new flag with three horizontal stripes - green, yellow and red - and a white star in the middle. No official word has been given yet on what the stripes stand for. Here's hope that they symbolize Aung San's dream of genuine unity with the country's ethnic minority groups.

Stanley A Weiss is founding chairman of Business Executives for National Security, a nonpartisan organization based in Washington.

Cyber Majan
Um Tu Lum(USA)/ October 3, 2010

Tinang a Mungdan kata hta kaga Mungdan langai ngai kaw na hpyen nbungli hte bawm sa jahkrat yang shing nrai tinang a mung shawa masha ni hpe sa gap sat ai rai yang dai amu hpe galaw shut ai mungdan de Hpyenla Hpyendap ni hpe sa nhtawm gasat ai shing nrai Majan kaba htam hpaw gasat ai lam shinggyim masha ni a prat labau ting hta ya du hkra byin ai majan law law nga nga ai.

Raitim, tinang a mungdan kata na Myihprap Wan jaw ai lam, Kyit Hkai lam, Sut masa lam, hte Amyu sha Shim Lam ni hpe kaga mungdan ni shing nrai Uhpung langai ngai kaw na Kompyuta hte gasat wa ai shaloi gara ladat hte makawp maga na, kaning re Tara kanu ni hte hpa-ran na ngu ai hpe lai wa sai 4/5 ning daram du hkra grak lagra masat jahkrat tawn lu ai lam nnga tim 2008-2009 ning kaw na UN hte Mungkan  Mungdan shagu ngu na daram Mungkan Mungdan a Shimlam madang atsang hku n’na myit sawn galaw hpang wa nga ai hpe chye lu ai.

Mungkan hta Komputa hpaji hpe laknak shatai nhtawm kaga mungdan ni de shing nrai tinang a hpyen rai nga ai/shing jawng ra ai Mungdan/wuhpung ni de gasat ai lam hpe galaw hpang wa nga ai mungdan law law kaw na grau dandawng ai mungdan ni gaw; US, UK, Russia, China, India, N.Korea, Israel hte Iran mungdan ni re hpe chye lu ai.

Gasat ai Ladat
Cyberwar ngu ai gaw- mungdan langai hte langai lapran, wuhpung langai hte lngai lapran, hpyen tai hkat sai shing nrai shing-jawng hkat nga ai hpung ni a lapran sung lang hpang wa nga ai madang tsaw Kompyuta majan rai nga ai.
N’nan hpang wa ai shaloi kaga mungdan wuhpung ni a shim hkra makawp maga tawn ai kata na ahkyak ai lawng lam ni hpe nchye hkra shaw la/lagu la ai ladat(hacking) kompyuta hpaji raitim hpang daw de gaw mungdan kata na Hpyen Dap, Kai-chyan Dap, Myihprap Wan(Electrical Grids), Hka jaw lam, Nhprang Sau(Gas), Kit-hkai lam (telecommunication), Hkawmsa Hkawmwa Lam(Trasportation), Sut Hpaga Lam hte kaga mungdan masha ni a shani shagu na bungli bungsi ni hpe du hkra shang chying-lau jahten kau ya lu ai pratdep majan amyu hpan langai re majaw kaning re mungdan kaji/ kaba nnga jahkring myi na aten ladaw hta e hten agrawp mat hkra galaw lu ai sha n-ga  uphkang nga ai Asuya a bungli ma hkra hpe mung hkring mat hkra atsam kaba rawng ai majaw tsang ra dik htum re ngu n’na mungkan masha ni chye na hpang wa nga sai.

2009 ning April shata hta China(Miwa) hte Russia kaw na US mungdan a electrical girds hpe gan hkring/hten hkra cyber attack galaw ai ngu mara shagun ai hpe China(Miwa) Asuya kaw na dai lam shanhte nchye ai ngu bai ningdang masai, dai manghkang hte la-kap nhtawm hkrit na zawn nga chye lu ai gaw shing-re cyber attack galaw wa yang Dingdung American mungdan ni a Myihprap Wan jaw ai lam hpe makawp maga lu ai lam nnga ai hpe The North Amerian Electirc Realiability Corporation  (NERC) kaw n’na mungdan shawa masha ni de ndau tawn chyalu re hpe chye lu ai.

Mungkan ting na Jak Shagan ni Jak Hkrang Leng ni a hkawm sa shamu shamawt ai lam yawng shimlam nnga, tsang ra ai madang du nga sai hte maren mungkan masha ni a shani shagu na dut-lu dut-sha lam hta mung shimlam nnga wa ai gaw shaning pyi ram ram na wa nga sai(ga shadawn:  manang wa a credit card numbers ni hpe lagu la ya ai lam ni rai nga ai), dai majaw mungkan shinggyim masha ni a shani shagu na sak hkrung hkawm sa ai lam hta shimlam nnga hpang wa sai sha n-ga mungdan shagu na Asuya ni a galaw lu ai atsam hpe du hkra aten nlata jahten agrawp kau ya lu ai atsam nga ai hpe asan sha chye na lu nga ai.   

Cyber warfare ndai gaw hkring mat na lam nnga sai, grau grau hkrit tsang ra ai madang atsang de grau grau lu wa magang sai. Mungdan shagu ngu na daram ndai warfare hpe shagreng wa ai zawn mung masa hpung, hpaga yumga hpung ni hte laknak lang rawt malan hpung nkau pyi ndai warfare hpe nsim nsa madang sharawt  galaw hpang nga sai madang atsang hte Du-hkra Ladaw de du shang nga sai lam chye lu ai. Shingrai cyberwarfare hpe shagreng wa nga yang US Asuya hku n’na 2010 ning May shata e Pentagon Rung Kaba kaw n’na Cyber Command (Cybercom) ngu ai Hpyen Rung hpe hpaw shabawn tawn sai lam mung chye lu ai, UK Asuya hku n’na mung Cyber-Scurity ngu ai Magam Dap n’nan hpe 2010 ning hta hpaw shabawn tawn sai lam chye lu ai.

Miwa Asuya gaw htawm hpang aten na Cyberwar a matu hpyen hpung ni hpe shagreng tawn sai sha n-ga, Kylin ngu ai operating system hpe gyin shalat sung lang nhtawm US mungdan a Hpyen hte Kai-chyan dap ni de tinang a asuya rung hte hpyen dap ni hta sung lang nga ai kompyuta ni hte shang chying lau lu na matu shani shana shagreng nga ai lam mung chye lu ai. Cyber warfare a matu shagreng nga ai kaga mungdan ni hku n’na Russia, Israel, N. Korea ni rai nga ma ai, Iran mungdan gaw mungkan hta nambat lahkawng kaba dik Cyber-Army hpe hpaw shabawn tawn lu sai mungdan re ngu n’na mungkan de ndau dat ai kade n’na yang shi a mungdan kata na Jak Rung ni hte Nuclear Facility yawng kaw “Stuxnet” ngu ai Kompyuta Worm hte 2010 ning September Shata e gasat hkrum nu ai, kadai mungdan ni re ngu ai hpe atsawm nlu tsun tim Israel mungdan hpe kalang lata myi n-gyeng yu azi na gaw lai nli rai nga na sai.

Shingrai mungdan law law, Wuhpung(Organizations/Groups) law law Cyber warfare hpe shagreng wa nga ma-yang, US Mungdan Asuya a Cybersecurity Specialist rai nga ai James Gosler gaw mungdan a shimlam hpe tup-hkrak makawp maga lu na lam hte seng n’na myit tsang ai lam byin nga ai hpe chye lu ai, Hpa majaw nga yang mungdan a shimlam hpe tup-hkrak galaw lu na matu kompyuta hpaji kung-kyang ai masha marai 20,000 – 30,000 daram ra ai raitim US mungdan e ya hkyak hkyak magam gun nga ai masha marai 1,000 hte sha mai byin ai madang hte bungli galaw nga ai re majaw tang du du galaw lu na nre lam hpe mung chye lu ai.

Cyber Warfare hte kapyawn n’na daini  mungkan masha ni maja wa nga ai kaga lam langai gaw Nanotechnology ngu ai hpungtang jak hpaji n’nan rai nga ai. Cyber Warefare hpe mungdan law law wuhpung law law n-gun dat shagreng wa nga ai ten ndai mau na zawn, yu maya shinggyim masha ni nlu sawn maram lu ai hpungtang hpaji hpe mung kalang lata Cyber Warfare hte rau ja gumhpraw law law htum hkam n’na shakut wa nga ai aten ladaw Tsa-ban(century) hta du nga saka ai majaw mungkan shinggyin masha ni a shani shagu na sak hkrung hkawmsa, kan bau ai lam, mungdan makawp maga lam hte mungkan du hkra ladaw a shim lam hpe gadai mung tup-hkrak nlu tsun ai aten de du magang wa nga sai ngu yang nshut nga ai.

Nanotechnology
K. Eric Drexler ngu ai Hpungtang Hpaji ninghkring wa kaw n’na 1980 ning e mungkan masha ni chye hkra gang shapraw dat lu ai hpungtang hpaji langai rai nga ai, shi tsun ai hta shinggyim masha ni ya sung lang nga ai jak arung arai nkau hpe dik hkra kaji ai madang, Molecules madang hte nanometers(1 nanometer = 1e -9 Meters) shadawn shadang du hkra kaji ai madang the gyin shalat galaw sung lang mat wa na ngu ai hta motors, robot arms sha nrai kompyuta zawn re jak ni hpe du hkra galaw shalat na hpaji rai nga ai, tsun mayu ai gaw jak arung arai kaji ni a madang hpe cell langai hta grau kaji hkra gyin shalat na matu myit sawn  shapraw dat ai hpungtang jak hpaji rai nga ai.
Ndai nanotechnology ngu ai hpungtang jak hpaji hpe mungkan ting na hpungtang hpaji ninghkring ni(Scientists) hkap la shagrin tawn sai hte maren US Mungdan Asuya kaw n’na mung National Nanotechnology Initiative ngu ai hpe hpaw shabawn nhtawm woi galaw hpang nga sai lam chye lu ai.

References

1. Clarke, Richard A. Cyber War, HarperCollins (2010)
2. Cyberwar:  War in the Fifth Domain   Economist, July 1, 2010
3. Wikipedia
4. The Washington Times, May 12, 2009
5. Irrawaddy News online Magazine   September Issue 2010

Lahta na gangau gaw Um Tu Lum (USA)kawn sawk sagawn ka lajang da ai rai n’na, n’dai hta lawm ai ningmu ni gaw shi a hkrai rai nga ai.

Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices
Brian McCartan, Asia Times/ June 25, 2010

Elections slated for later this year in Myanmar seem increasingly unlikely to democratically empower the country's various ethnic minority groups, which combined account for over 30% of the population.

While the ruling generals have touted the inclusiveness of their tightly controlled democratic transition, critics say the new constitution ignores ethnic demands for federalism while junta-drafted election laws prohibit the participation of the largest ethnic parties, some of which are attached to armed insurgent groups who for decades have fought for greater autonomy.

The ruling junta has yet to announce a date for the elections, but many observers believe they will he held sometime in October. They will be the first polls held in Myanmar since 1990, when the opposition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory against military-sponsored parties, only to see the results annulled by the military before they could take power.

The generals have made clear their intention to hold new polls and that the participation of the NLD and ethnic ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups is not essential to their credibility. The NLD announced on March 29 that it would not re-register under the new election laws, which it considered unfair because of regulations that bar Aung San Suu Kyi, the party's detained leader, from contesting the polls.

A number of NLD party leaders and other members have argued that non-participation plays into the regime's hands by not providing an alternative to the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National Unity Party (NUP).

At least 39 other political parties have so far applied for registration with the newly formed election commission. Of those, only 15 are considered national parties, while many of the rest aim specifically to represent the interests of ethnic groups, including the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan.

The question of whether to participate in the elections has been as contentious an issue among ethnic political groups as it was with the NLD. Some see the electoral process as a sham for perpetuating military rule under the guise of democracy and advocate a boycott of the polls. Others believe the elections offer an unique chance to work from within the system and an alternative to the confrontation and armed struggle that has plagued Myanmar politics since independence from the UK in 1948.

The second and third most successful parties in the 1990 elections after the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan League for Democracy have both supported the NLD's stand and opted not to re-register their parties for the upcoming election. The SNLD's decision was also based on the junta's refusal to free its two top leaders, who were both arrested on political charges in 2005.

Local contests
Significantly, many of the ethnic-based parties are looking to contest seats in local legislatures rather than at the national level. With their relative small sizes, the high cost of party registration and their lack of a national voice, many aspiring ethnic politicians feel that their chances of success and ability to effect change are better on the local level.

Parties representing larger ethnic groups, such as the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), are seeking to contest the elections at all levels within their own states. Still other parties representing ethnic groups with much wider geographic coverage, such as the Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), intend to contest the election for both local legislatures and at the national level across several states and divisions.

Competing for seats on state legislatures may have some real, if limited, advantages for ethnic aspirations. The new legislatures mandated by the 2008 constitution are a departure from the military-dominated "Peace and Development Committees" that currently decide policy in ethnic minority areas and are often a direct arm of the central government.

Ethnic politicians hope that the local legislative bodies will be more representative of local communities and give them more say over affairs that matter to their ethnic constituents. With popular representation, there may be more opportunities for the promotion of local cultures and languages though influence over the media and education. Also important is to gain more influence and scrutiny over the exploitation of natural resources in ethnic minority areas.

According to a recent report on the elections by the Transnational Institute, "Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders point out that they will have a legitimate voice for the first time. This will allow ethnic grievances, in the past too easily dismissed as the seditious rumblings of separatist insurgents, to be openly raised."

Without ethnic participation, the government backed, and largely ethnic Myanmar USDP and NUP will be calling the shots not only nationally, but also in the regional legislatures. While a far cry from the federalism that many ethnic leaders aspire for, the local legislatures offer the first forms of local autonomy since the post 1962 coup government of General Ne Win abolished ethnic councils established under the 1947 constitution.

A post-independence federal system was promised as a result of a conference held at the town of Panglong in northern Myanmar between independence leader General Aung San and representatives of several ethnic groups. Federal principles agreed to at the conference were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but by the late 1950's many felt they had not been adequately implemented. Agitation for a more truly federalist system was a major cause of the 1962 military coup, which was carried out in the name of preserving national unity.

Myanmar's 2008 constitution keeps the seven ethnic states and creates seven new self-administered zones for less numerous ethnic groups such as the Pa-O, Kokang and Wa. However, it makes few other concessions to ethnic aspirations for federalism and power sharing between ethnic groups and the majority Myanmar population. During the 1993-2008 National Convention that drafted the constitution, calls by ethnic representatives for a federal union were ignored.

There is growing evidence that the generals are seeking to undermine and split the ethnic vote at the upcoming elections. This is being done largely through the junta's mass organization, the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), and its newly formed political party, the USDP.

Many members of the USDP are former military officers and current members of government who have resigned their ranks to participate in the polls. They have actively courted ethnic minorities to join the junta-backed USDP. In the case of the disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar, that has taken the form of offering identity cards granting them formal citizenship in exchange for their votes.

According to the exile-run media group Shan Herald Agency for News, USDP members have used the USDA and local government officials to canvass for votes and to pressure villagers in Shan State to sign their names on the party's rolls. Shan leaders in Mandalay Division, where there are significant Shan populations, were approached in March to run as part of the USDP.

The junta has also effectively blocked several of the major ethnic political players from taking part in the elections due to an impasse over the transformation of armed ceasefire groups into army-controlled border guard units. The regime's seven-step "roadmap to democracy" had originally envisioned that the groups would either hand over their weapons or join the border guard force as a prelude to forming political parties and contesting the election.

Pre-election tension
That step was supposed to be accomplished before an election date was announced. Instead tensions have spiked between the junta and the ethnic militias as several deadlines have passed - the latest on April 28 - and the issue still remains unresolved. Over 20 ethnic insurgent groups have agreed to ceasefires with the junta since 1989 and have since largely run their own affairs. They consider retaining their weapons as a necessary protection until the generals can prove the sincerity of their political promises.

Only a few, mostly small groups have agreed to the junta's terms, including the National Democratic Army - Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA). However, their political leaders have resigned and are now seeking to register respectively as the Union Democracy Party (Kachin State) and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party.

The Kokang only agreed after a short offensive by the army drove out the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2009 and brought in new leadership. The new leadership quickly declared its support for the 2010 elections and formed a political party.

Larger groups such as the United Wa State Party (UWSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have not been allowed to register parties for the election. Instead the regime has threatened to revoke the ceasefire status of groups and declare them illegal. Most recently tensions have increased in Mon State, where the NMSP has refused to meet with the military’s intelligence head Lieutenant General Ye Myint to discuss the border guard issue. The junta has threatened to use force if the Mon does not agree to a meeting.

Keeping the ceasefire groups out of the polls may work to the generals' electoral advantage. A June 2010 report by the Transnational Institute on the ethnic political situation described the ethnic ceasefire organizations, "in terms of history, membership, finance, and territorial control, the ceasefire forces far outweigh electoral parties in their ability to operate independently and, with an estimated 40,000 troops under arms, their existence was a continued reminder of the need for conflict resolution."

Both the Wa and the Kachin have said that they would like to support ethnic parties in the polls and negotiate the decommissioning of their armed wings with the new government after the elections. After two decades of unresolved political issues and disappointment in the 2008 constitution, they want to see proof of real political reform before agreeing to hand over their weapons.

Indeed, the election commission has so far refused to accept the registration of three Kachin political parties. While two of the parties represent former ceasefire groups who have now become border guards, the KSPP has several former KIO members, including its leader, former KIO vice chairman Tu Ja. Some observers believe the party's registration has yet to be approved because of these links.

There is also a fear that the government will declare a state of emergency in the ceasefire areas, which would prohibit people standing for elections and voting. Already areas of southern Shan State and Karen State are unlikely to be allowed to vote due to a legal provision that says elections can only be held in areas free of conflict. This would mean that large portions of Myanmar would not be allowed to elect representatives to local or national legislatures.

Border-based ethnic political organizations, many of which are attached to armed insurgent groups still fighting the government, will not be able to take part in the elections. Although they have seemingly declined in strength and influence in recent years, their message of equal rights and justice still resonates with many people who see the newly formed parties as junta stooges.

Peace talks with the government will also have to wait until a new government is formed following the elections. A section of the Political Parties Registration Law prohibits registration to any party that is involved with groups engaged in armed rebellion or involved with groups declared as "unlawful associations".

The generals will be hard-pressed to prove the legitimacy of the elections without the participation of ethnic opposition parties or adequate ethnic representation. Should the ethnic groups continue to feel disempowered and a democratically elected pro-military government maintain the junta's current confrontational policies, further conflict will be almost unavoidable and hinder the country's supposed democratic transition.

Tensions rising between Myanmar’s military junta and the Kachin Independence Army
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly / May 06, 2010

Tensions are rising between Myanmar’s military junta and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), as the latter continues to reject transformation into a border guard force.

Not all anniversaries are to be celebrated; 28 April marked a year since Myanmar’s government proposed to integrate some 20 ethnic insurgent ceasefire groups into the Tat­madaw (armed forces). Despite a year of negotia­tions, agreement on the proposal seems no closer.

The border guard force (BGF) initiative coin­cides with the military government’s (State Peace and Development Council: SPDC) efforts to secure the participation of these groups’ political wings in elections designed to formalise the mili­tary’s control over the government.

Weaker ceasefire groups have had little choice but to comply with the Tatmadaw’s demands. However, stronger groups have reacted obsti­nately to the initiative. One of these is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which remains a formidable military group. A spokesman for the KIA’s political wing, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), told Jane’s it boasts 25,000 personnel, including between 7,000 and 8,000 ground troops. These figures may be exaggerated, but the group can also draw on its 7,000-strong militarised youth wing.

Irreconcilable differences
Visiting the KIA’s headquarters in Laiza on 16 April, Jane’s was told why the BGF initiative is seen as unworkable. According to the proposal, each BGF unit would be commanded by three majors, including a commander and vice-com­mander drawn from the ethnic armies and an intelligence-cum-administrative officer from the government’s army, significantly restricting the group’s autonomy. The KIA’s independence would be further compromised by the integration of 29 other officers and
non-commissioned officers from the army into each of the 326-strong units. Subordinated to the Tatmadaw’s directorate of militias and border guard forces, the BGF units would be inferior to infantry battalions.

As an incentive, the Tatmadaw promised the KIA salaries, provisions and armaments. How­ever, the proposal would retire soldiers over the age of 50 and sideline senior KIA commanders. The proposal also omits any mention of the KIO, which governs the Kachin State Special Region 2.

In an attempt to resolve the ongoing dispute, 16 meetings between the SPDC and KIO have taken place, but these have achieved little. The KIO’s ini­tial counter-proposal to the BGF was to rename the KIA as the Kachin Regional Guard Force and jointly govern Kachin state with the new govern­ment. The SPDC rejected this on the basis that the BGF was modeled on international practices, and that the creation of autonomous ethnic forces would restore a system of administration that had failed under the previous U Nu government.

In later meetings, the KIO invoked the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which gave ethnic areas on the periphery of the state internal administrative autonomy. In response, the northern commander Major General Soe Win declared: “The age of Panglong has been cancelled and it is gone now.”

Following the last meeting in April, the KIO proposed informally that the entire BGF issue be set aside for resolution under the new govern­ment, and that it neither participate nor interfere in the elections. The SPDC spurned the offer.

Finally, on 15 April, the KIA dispatched a letter to Naypyidaw acknowledging that it would accept a role within the Tatmadaw, but only on the basis of equality as part of a union army. On 23 April, the two sides agreed to continue their dialogue.

Growing tensions
Against this background of uncertainty, a series of recent bomb explosions have highlighted increased military tension. On 15 April, three bombs exploded in downtown Yangon. According to the state-run newspaper New Light of Myanmar, the incident killed 10 people and injured 170. On the same day, a bomb blast also occurred in the town of Muse at the main border trade gate with China. Although no one has claimed responsibility for either blast, several of the ceasefire groups have indicated that if fighting resumes they will wage urban warfare.

Two days later, 27 bombs exploded at a contro­versial hydropower project north of Myitkyina. The project has been a source of tension as it will displace 60 Kachin villages. Government officials are publicly linking the BGF issue and these bombs. On the morning of the explosions, the SPDC-supported Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) reported that unexploded ordnance at the site resembled KIA-manufactured bombs.

The KIA vehemently denied any involvement in the bombings when speaking to Jane’s. How­ever, several weeks before, the USDA revealed that authorities had arrested a man in possession of 32 remote-controlled bombs. According to their account, the man confessed he had attended a two-day training course in explosives organised by the KIA, which had dispatched him and 49 other underground operatives with small stipends and dozens of explosives.

Forecast
Amid growing tensions, the two sides appear to be at loggerheads. The SPDC remains resolute, while the KIA position requires either constitutional redrafting or their exclusion from the process, neither of which the SPDC wants to accept. A resumption of hostilities is possible, but undesirable
for all parties. The SPDC is likely to forge ahead with elections and resolve the status of the ceasefire groups later. However, without a settlement the country’s deep-rooted ethnic problems will only fester.

Time to bring Burma's brutal generals to justice
Benedict Rogers / April 25, 2010

Frightened, vulnerable and with a tone of despair, a man with no legs and five children sat in the darkness under a tarpaulin and whispered: "When I had two legs, I could earn money for the whole family and I could give my children money for snacks. Now I cannot provide for them. It is not a normal life. I had to flee the Burma army many times. I did portering for the Burma army many times."

His legs had been blown off by a landmine that he stepped on in the jungle while looking for vegetables, he said. His story was typical of many of the refugees along the Thai-Burma border who were subjected to forced labour by the military regime, and his conclusion summed up his people's struggle: "Run and run and run until now -- this is my life."

Since January, the refugees have been facing constant harassment from the Thai military, and in February the Thai authorities were ready to deport them to Burma. The deportations were averted at the last moment after international pressure, but the harassment continued. Most of the refugees have since given in to the grinding intimidation and fled the camp. Some have returned to a life on the run in the jungle; others may have attempted to disperse in Thailand as illegal immigrants. Those who have gone back to their villages have walked into a death trap, in an area full of landmines, controlled by the Burmese army, where they would almost certainly be subjected to forced labour and torture.

More than 3500 villages in eastern Burma have been destroyed since 1996, and at least a million people displaced. Forced labour, rape and torture are widespread and systematic. I met one refugee who said she had been forced to dig her own grave, and another whose parents were killed when he was a boy and whose wife and children were later shot dead.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma concluded last month that this "pattern of gross and systematic violation of human rights" was "the result of a state policy that involves authorities in the executive, military and judiciary at all levels". The rapporteur argues that the Burmese regime may be guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes, and says the UN should establish a commission of inquiry to investigate.

Australia, Britain and the Czech Republic have agreed in principle with the rapporteur's call for an investigation. Now they need to work to achieve it.
However, many in the international community refuse to accept the truth: that Burma's military regime is illegitimate and criminal. When the regime published its election laws recently, the reaction was muted. Yet the election laws show more blatantly than ever what a sham the regime's planned election will be.

No wonder the National League for Democracy has decided to boycott the sham poll.

The new laws ban political prisoners from belonging to a political party, which means the NLD would have to abandon its leader, Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, and hundreds of its members.

Political parties are required to support the new constitution, pushed through in a sham referendum two years ago, which gives the military a quarter of the parliamentary seats and bans Suu Kyi from seeking election.

The NLD, which won the last elections in 1990 with 82 per cent of the seats, is fighting for its existence and will probably be deemed illegal by the regime after May 7. Yet all US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley said was: "This is not what we had suggested to the Burmese government."

However, some countries appear to have had enough. Burma's neighbours are increasingly frustrated. The Philippines Foreign Minister has described the elections as "a complete farce".

In Burma, opinion is divided. Some people intend to take part, in the hope of prising open some space for the future. Others argue that the polls should be boycotted. Both positions are understandable, and the choice is tough.

But for the international community, the choice is clear. It must not give the election any credibility. Instead, the UN must insist no process that so blatantly excludes Suu Kyi and the NLD can be acceptable. A Security Council resolution should call on the regime to engage in dialogue with the NLD and ethnic groups, and spell out benchmarks that are required to measure progress. It is time for the UN to do the right thing: reject the election, investigate the war crimes claims and bring the generals to justice. Only then is there a chance of real change for Burma.

Benedict Rogers is a human rights advocate with Christian Solidarity Worldwide, based in London, and the author of a new biography of Burma's dictator, Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant, to be published next month by Silkworm Books

A rebel stronghold in Myanmar on alert
New York Times / November 06, 2009

Conquering armies of centuries past avoided this remote, mountainous area along the present-day border with China, a place once described by a British colonial official as "an unpenetrated enclave of savage hills."

Inhabited by the Wa, an ethnic group once notorious for headhunting, neither the British colonial overlords nor the Burmese kings who preceded them saw much point in controlling the area.

But to Myanmar's military government this rebel region is an irritating piece of unfinished business and an impediment to the long-cherished goal of national unity. Myanmar's generals are demanding that the Wa disband their substantial army here and fully subjugate themselves to the central government, a call that has so far gone unheeded. Both sides are bracing for potential conflict.

The tensions here might be glossed over by outsiders as yet another arcane dispute in strife-ridden Myanmar between the government and a mistrustful minority, except that the Wa have a well-equipped army of at least 20,000 full-time soldiers -- about twice the size of Ireland's armed forces -- and are considered by the United States government as hosts to one of the world's largest illicit drug operations.

Conflict in the Wa-controlled areas, if it is not averted, could cause a ramping up of drug trafficking across Asia and beyond as the Wa government and other militias seek cash to buy weapons.

Northern Myanmar is very much a world apart, both lawless and heavily militarized, a medieval-style patchwork of obscure ethnic armies, borderland casinos, brothels and the walled compounds of drug lords.

Many rounds of negotiations between Myanmar's generals and the ethnic groups arrayed like an arc across the northern reaches of the country have yielded nothing but delay for what many analysts believe is a likely showdown. Wa soldiers have been put on standby.

"We were told to be ready and to keep a careful watch," said Ai Yee, a soldier from the Wa ethnic group who is based in Pangshang, the headquarters of the United Wa State Army. "We are on the lookout for anyone coming in -- 24 hours a day."

Mr. Ai spoke cautiously and reluctantly. Few outsiders visit the areas under Wa control, except Chinese businessmen, drug traffickers and the occasional official from the United Nations.

The Wa are the most heavily armed of about a dozen groups opposing calls by Myanmar's military government to become border guards in time for the introduction of a new constitution next year. The generals who lead this country, formerly known as Burma, consider the constitution and the elections that will accompany it a milestone that will bring the national consolidation that has long eluded them.

Myanmar's top two commanders, Senior Gen. Than Shwe and Vice Senior Gen.Maung Aye, now in their 70s, appear eager to finally bring the ethnic groups to heel.

But the ferocity of the Wa, their apparent lack of fear and their talent for silent, nighttime attacks remain embedded in the memories of the generals, who fought and lost many bloody battles against them in the decades after independence from Britain in 1948.

The potential scale of conflict is daunting. The Wa have a significant arsenal, including about 300 shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles, antitank weapons and ample assault rifles and ammunition, said Col. Peeranate Katetem of the Thai Army, who has spent a decade tracking the Wa.

Including reserve soldiers, Colonel Peeranate estimates the total troop strength of the Wa, who control two noncontiguous territories, at around 50,000 soldiers.

The Wa's fearsome reputation comes partly from their harvest rituals involving the severed heads of rival tribe members, a practice that ceased sometime after World War II. Early foreign visitors, many of them missionaries, found "skull groves" in the jungles outside villages.

Today the mystique of the Wa persists. Young children in Myanmar are told to come home before dark lest they be grabbed by the Wa.

These are outdated images. Here in Mong Hpen, a stronghold of the United Wa State Army, Wa children play games at a downtown Internet cafe close to the market, which is dominated by Chinese merchants. There are reminders in Mong Hpen of what the Wa stand to lose if they capitulate to the demands of Myanmar's rulers: Like many other ethnic groups, the Wa have their own schools, hospitals, electricity grid and phone services. The Internet here is fast and free of censorship by the Myanmar government.

The handful of foreign analysts who have studied the Wa, some of whom cannot be identified because of the sensitivity of their work with foreign militaries or law enforcement agencies, say the Wa are a disciplined and militaristic society. Those who do not fall into line are severely dealt with. Municipal work in Mong Hpen is partly carried out by chain gangs: prisoners in clanking leg irons hack away at the embankment of the main road near the local jail.

Older soldiers in Myanmar are inured to warfare. Fighting between the central government and Chinese-backed Communist forces, which included Wa soldiers, flared for decades until a series of cease-fire agreements beginning in 1989. All males in Wa territory are required to enter the army, and many, if not most, never leave, often pursuing dual careers as soldiers and farmers. Almost all households in the Wa and a neighboring allied fief known as Mong La include at least one man in uniform.

"We are not afraid to fight," said Chai Saam, a soldier from the Shan ethnic group who has been in the Mong La army for 35 years and who fought frequently against the central government in the first half of his military career. "But we are afraid the air force will burn our villages."

He added: "We are afraid they will steal treasure from our villages. We are afraid the Burmese soldiers will rape women."

Even with their significant forces the Wa and other ethnic groups would be vastly outnumbered by the Myanmar Army, which has about 450,000 soldiers and advanced weaponry. The Wa have built a series of underground bunkers in Pangshang, according to Bertil Lintner, an expert on ethnic groups in Myanmar who is based in Thailand. But hiding might simply postpone defeat.
If they are attacked, the crucial question for all the ethnic groups in northern Myanmar is what stance China would take.

"I don't think the Wa can sustain a prolonged campaign unless they get supplies from China -- at the very least food and fuel," Mr. Lintner said.
China has divided loyalties in Myanmar. In recent years it has supported Myanmar's central government as a geostrategic ally, coveting the country's reserves of oil and gas and access to the Indian Ocean. But China also has long-standing ties with all the armed ethnic groups along the border, and many ethnic Chinese live, work and have businesses inside Myanmar.

Almost all the ethnic groups -- the Akha, Lahu, Kachin, Shan and Wa among them -- straddle the border between Myanmar and China, and many travel across as if there were no border.

Beijing has reportedly sought assurances from Thein Sein, the Myanmar prime minister, that peace will prevail along the border. After a recent meeting of Asian leaders in Thailand, China's state-run news agency, Xinhua, quoted Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China as saying that Myanmar "could properly handle problems and safeguard peace and stability in the China-Myanmar border region."

China has been especially concerned about the situation since attacks in August by the Myanmar military against the Kokang, a small ethnic Chinese group. That campaign, combined with another attack by government proxies against Karen rebels in June, seems to suggest that the Myanmar junta's demands that ethnic groups yield to its control are not idle threats. The Kokang attack caused panic among wealthy ethnic Chinese families, and many fled the Wa region, according to the Shan Herald Agency for News, an online outlet devoted to news from northern Myanmar.

The northern reaches of Myanmar are playgrounds of vice for Chinese tourists and businessmen who stream across the border. The territory of Mong La is run by Lin Mingxian, a former Red Guard during China's Cultural Revolution who today has a private army of about 3,000 men, separate from but allied with the Wa forces.

During daylight hours the town appears sleepy. But when night falls hundreds of prostitutes line up in orderly queues waiting for patrons who arrive in taxis. More entrepreneurial prostitutes hand out calling cards at outdoor restaurants. Hotels charge by the hour. Casinos in the nearby town of Mong Ma lure Chinese gamblers. At a morning market hawkers sell exotic animals from inland jungles -- both live and skinned.

The steep hills in northern Myanmar are lined with rubber plantations that feed Chinese factories' demand for latex. There is extreme poverty -- thatch huts and farmers tending fields with buffalo -- but also much unexplained wealth: modern, walled compounds and the frequent passage of Mitsubishi Pajeros and Toyota Prado Land Cruisers, vehicles that cost well upward of $100,000 in southern Myanmar because of onerous import duties. (Residents of rebel-held areas in northern Myanmar avoid the taxes because cars are imported through Laos or China and bear license plates issued either by the Wa or Mong La governments.)

United States and Thai counternarcotic officials believe that most of the Wa wealth comes from selling methamphetamine and heroin, both of which have been pouring across the border with Thailand in recent months in unusually large quantities as the Wa and other groups seek cash to buy weapons. The kingpin of the Wa drug operations is Wei Hsueh-kang, according to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. He is one of 19 Wa leaders sought by the American authorities. The United States is offering $2 million to anyone who helps arrest Mr. Wei, who was born in China but has held leadership positions in the Wa government over the past decade.

Given their isolation it seems unlikely that the Wa leadership will be arrested anytime soon. But American counternarcotics officials argue that the indictments have limited the leaders' ability to travel and run businesses outside of their territory.

"We have shrunk their cage -- immobilized them to some degree," said Pamela Brown, an agent for the D.E.A. based in northern Thailand. "If at some point they travel into a country with whom the United States has an extradition treaty we are poised to extradite them."

The situation in northern Myanmar presents a dilemma for the United States, which has made overtures toward Myanmar's generals in recent months after having only very limited contact for the past two decades. The United States would like to see a crackdown on drug lords and their protectors. But military campaigns by the Myanmar government have frequently been accompanied by widespread atrocities, including the burning of villages, the use of child soldiers and rapes.

"We're opposed to drug trafficking, but certainly we don't want the military to go in and attack people and create human rights violations as they have in the past," Scot Marciel, the State Department official charged with policy for Southeast Asia, said in Bangkok Thursday.

"It's very complicated."

To the outside world, especially countries in Asia struggling to cope with heroin and methamphetamine addictions, a critical question is how a conflict would affect the supply of illicit drugs.

Mr. Lintner is pessimistic. Even if Myanmar's military prevails against the ethnic groups, drug trafficking will not be eradicated, he said. Much of the opium harvested today in Myanmar is grown in areas currently controlled, officially at least, by the central government, he said.

"Local militias would probably persist -- and with them the drug trade," he said. "These areas would remain lawless."